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Abstract. Given a sequence of random variables X = X1, X2, . . . suppose the aim is
to maximize one’s return by picking a ‘favorable’ Xi. Obviously, the expected payoff
crucially depends on the information at hand. An optimally informed person knows
all the values Xi = xi and thus receives E(supXi). We will compare this return to
the expected payoffs of a number of observers having less information, in particular
supi(EXi), the value of the sequence to a person who only knows the first moments of
the random variables.
In general, there is a stochastic environment (i.e. a class of random variables C), and
several levels of information. Given some X ∈ C, an observer possessing information j
obtains rj(X). We are going to study ‘information sets’ of the form
Rj,kC = {(x, y)|x = rj(X), y = rk(X),X ∈ C},
characterizing the advantage of k relative to j. Since such a set measures the additional
payoff by virtue of increased information, its analysis yields a number of interesting
results, in particular ‘prophet-type’ inequalities.
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1 Several Information Levels
Suppose there is a sequence of bounded random variables X = X1, X2, . . . and the aim
is to maximize one’s return by picking a ‘favorable’Xi. The first aim of this contribution
is to study observers with different kinds of information:
Suppose an observer knows all the realizations of the random variables and may thus
choose the largest one. His expected return is therefore
m =M(X) = M(X1, X2, . . .) = E(sup
i
Xi), (1)
which is called the value to a prophet. Since the prophet always picks the largest
realization his value m is a natural upper bound, given a sequence X.
Traditionally,m has been compared to the value obtained by a statistician who observes
the process sequentially. This gambler, studied in detail in Chow, Robbins & Sigmund
(1971), relies on stopping rules T , which have to be measurable with respect to the
σ-field of past events. Behaving optimally the statistician may thus receive
v = V (X) = sup
T
EXT , (2)
If there is a finite horizon n, one defines v = supT∈T ,T≤nEXT andm = E(max1≤i≤nXi).
To avoid trivialities, we assume n ≥ 2 throughout this article.
A minimally informed gambler has to make his choice on the basis that he only knows
the random variables’ expected values. Behaving optimally, he gets
u = U(X) = sup
i
EXi, (3)
an amount that is entirely due to his (weak) prior information, and is a straightforward
counterpart to E(supiXi).
One might think that a person who knows the common distribution L(X1, . . . , Xn)
(but none of the observations) should receive a larger payoff. However, no matter
how this gambler makes up his mind, at the end of the day he has to choose an index
i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, and thus his expected reward will be largest if EXi = u. Thus, although
he knows much more than the minimally informed gambler his superior knowledge does
not pay off.
In other words, it’s the observations that make a difference. Suppose a person knows
the dependence structure among the random variables and some of the observations,
w.l.o.g. x1, . . . , xj . Notice, that there is no sequential unfolding of information, how-
ever, this partially informed gambler may use the values known to him to update his
knowledge on the variables not observed, i.e. he may refer to conditional expectations.
Thus he obtains
max[x1, . . . , xj , E(Xj+1|x1, . . . , xj), . . . , E(Xn|x1, . . . , xj)],
and his expected return is
w =W (X) = E(max(X1, . . . , Xj , E(Xj+1|X1, . . . , Xj), . . . , E(Xn|X1, . . . , Xj))). (4)
This observer can be reduced to a classical situation as follows: Given x1, . . . , xj, he
will only consider the largest of these values; and the same with E(Xj+1|x1, . . . , xj),
. . . , E(Xn|x1, . . . , xj). Thus w.l.o.g. it suffices to compare
max(x1, . . . , xj) and max(E(Xj+1|x1, . . . , xj), . . . , E(Xn|x1, . . . , xj))
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which is tantamount to the comparison of v and m if n = 2 and if arbitrary depen-
dencies are allowed. In this situation the statistician behaves optimally if he chooses
x1 whenever x1 ≥ E(X2|x1). Thus, the set of all possible values here is given by
{(w,m)|w ≤ m ≤ 2w − w2, 0 ≤ w ≤ 1} if w.l.o.g. 0 ≤ Xi ≤ 1 for all i.
Stochastic environments (classes of random variables)
For some fixed X, the difference between two observers with different amounts of
information can be nonexistent or arbitrarily large. In order to quantify the “value” of
information it is thus necessary to shift attention to some class of random variables C,
whereM(X) is finite (and nonnegative) for all X ∈ C. It is then natural to consider the
worst case scenarios. Traditionally these have been called prophet inequalities M(X)−
V (X) ≤ a and M(X)/V (X) ≤ b with smallest possible constants a and b that hold for
all X ∈ C.
Such stochastic inequalities follow easily from the more fundamental prophet region,
that is,
Rv,mC = {(x, y) | x = V (X), y = M(X);X ∈ C} = {(x, y) | x ≤ y ≤ fC(x)},
where fC is called the upper boundary function corresponding to C. Since it is only the
latter set that gives a complete description of some informational advantage, it is more
fundamental and should be considered in its own right.
In general, an information set characterizes the environment C, evaluated with the
help of two particular levels of information. One could also prioritise the information
edge and say that the difference between two levels of information (e.g. minimal vs.
sequential) is studied in a certain environment. It is the second major aim of this article
to illustrate a number of possible applications of these ideas.
2 Minimal versus maximum information
In this section we systematically compare u and m. That is, we are going to derive
corresponding information sets (called prophet regions since m is involved) in two
standard random environments: C(I, n), the class of all sequences of independent, [0, 1]-
valued random variables with horizon n; and C(G, n), the class of all sequences of
[0, 1]-valued random variables with horizon n.
Theorem 1 (independent environment). Let X = (X1, . . . , Xn) ∈ C(I, n), U(X) =
maxEXi and M(X) = E(maxXi). Then the prophet region {(x, y) | x = U(X), y =
M(X),X ∈ C(I, n)} is precisely the set
Ru,m
C(I,n) = {(x, y)|0 ≤ x ≤ y ≤ fn(x) = 1− (1− x)n; 0 ≤ x ≤ 1}.
Theorem 2 (general environment). LetX = (X1, . . . , Xn) ∈ C(G, n), U(X) = maxEXi,
and M(X) = EmaxXi. Then the upper boundary function hn of the prophet region
Ru,m
C(G,n) = {(x, y) | x = U(X), y =M(X),X ∈ C(G, n)} is
hn(x) =
{
nx if 0 ≤ x < 1/n
1 if 1/n ≤ x ≤ 1.
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Proof of Theorem 1: Without loss of generality let x = EX1 ≥ max2≤i≤nEXi.
Hill and Kertz (1981: Lemma 2.2) prove that X can be replaced by a ‘dilated’ vector
Y of Bernoulli random variables Y1, . . . , Yn such that EXi = EYi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and
M(X) ≤ M(Y). Replacing Y by a vector of iid Bernoulli random variables Z =
(Z1, . . . , Zn) such that EZi = x, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, does not improve the value to the gambler,
i.e. U(X) = U(Y) = U(Z) = x, however, M(Y) ≤ M(Z) = 1 − (1 − x)n. Since any
X ∈ C(I, n) can be replaced by a vector Z of iid Bernoulli random variables without
changing the value to the gambler, fn(x) is the upper boundary function. Defining
the independent random variables Z
′
1, . . . , Z
′
n by means of P (Z
′
i = λ + (1 − λ)x) =
x/(λ + x − λx) = 1 − P (Z ′i = 0) and 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1 proves that all points between (x, x)
and (x, 1− (1− x)n) also belong to the region. ♦
Notice that for every fixed x > 0, limn→∞ fn(x) ↑ 1 holds. Inspecting fn(x)/x and
fn(x)− x immediately yields:
Corollary 1 The prophet inequalities corresponding to C(I, n) are
M(X)/U(X) ≤ lim
x→0
fn(x)/x = n and M(X)− U(X) ≤ n−1/(n−1) − n−n/(n−1).
In the latter case, Z = (Z1, . . . , Zn) ∈ C(I, n) attains equality if the Zi are iid Bernoulli
random variables such that U(Z) = EZi = P (Zi = 1) = 1− n−1/(n−1).
Proof of Theorem 2: Denote by ei the i-th canonical unit vector. First consider the
random variable Z = (Z1, . . . , Zn) having the distribution
P (Z = e1) = . . . = P (Z = en) = 1/n.
A minimally informed person picks any of the random variables Zi, which is 1 with
probability 1/n and obtains U(Z) = 1/n. Since there is always exactly one i such
that Zi = 1, whereas all the other random variables are zero, M(Z) = E(maxZi) =
max1≤i≤n Zi ≡ 1.
To get a U(Z) ≥ 1/n, let P (Z = e1) = x ≥ 1/n and distribute the remaining proba-
bility equally among the other canonical unit vectors, i.e. P (Z = e2) = . . . = P (Z =
en) = (1− x)/(n− 1) ≤ x. Thus the minimally informed gambler may always pick the
first random variable, giving him U(Z) = EZ1 = x and for the same reasons as before
E(maxZi) = 1. Replacing ei by λei where 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1 and i = 2, . . . , n does not change
the value to the gambler, but the value to the prophet decreases towards x if λ ↓ 0.
Finally, let X = (X1, . . . , Xn) ∈ C(G, n) and U(X) = x < 1/n. On the set Ai =
{ω|Xi(ω) ≥ maxj,j 6=iXj(ω)} replace X(ω) = (X1(ω), . . . , Xn(ω)) by
Y(ω) = (0, . . . , 0, Xi(ω), 0, . . . , 0), i = 1, . . . , n. In the case of equality choose any
component (e.g. the first) where the maximum is attained. Since Xi(ω) ≥ Yi(ω) we
have U(X) = maxEXi ≥ maxEYi = U(Y) = y, and since max[X1(ω), . . . , Xn(ω)] =
max[Y1(ω), . . . , Yn(ω)], M(X) =M(Y).
By construction, at most one component ofY(ω) is larger than zero. Thus max1≤i≤n Yi(ω) =∑n
i=1 Yi(ω), and therefore
E(max
1≤i≤n
Yi) = E(
n∑
i=1
Yi) =
n∑
i=1
EYi ≤ n max
1≤i≤n
EYi.
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In the previous line equality is achieved if all expected values agree. Defining the
distribution of Z = (Z1, . . . , Zn) via
P (Z = e1) = . . . = P (Z = en) = y ≤ x < 1/n and P (Z = 0) = 1− ny
immediately yields U(Z) = y and M(Z) = ny. Since y may assume any value in the
interval [0, 1/n) we have shown that hn(x) = nx is the upper boundary function if
x < 1/n. A similar construction as before shows that all points between (x, x) and
(x, nx) belong to the prophet region. ♦
An immediate consequence of the last theorem is:
Corollary 2 The prophet inequalities corresponding to C(G, n) are M(X)/U(X) ≤ n
andM(X)−U(X) ≤ 1−1/n. In the latter case equality is attained by P (Z = ei) = 1/n,
(i = 1, . . . , n) where ei denotes the i-th canonical unit vector.
Remark. Although we focus on the prophet, other comparisons, in particular involving
the statistician, would be interesting too. Comparing u and v for example, reveals
the difference between prior information on the one hand and additional acquired
information (sequential observations) on the other.
3 Applying information sets
In this section we restrict attention to classical prophet-statistician comparisons (v vs.
m). However, the same kind of systematic analysis can be performed on any random
environment and observers with different levels of information. An example will be
given in the last section where we will compare u an m.
3.1 Some well-known results
To illustrate how information sets may be used, we first collect a number of well-
known results. To this end we introduce further random environments: Ciid, the class
of all sequences of iid, [0, 1]-valued random variables; CI , the class of all sequences
of independent, [0, 1]-valued random variables; CG, the class of all sequences of [0, 1]-
valued random variables, and their corresponding counterparts with finite horizon i.e.
Cniid, CnI = C(I, n) and CnG = C(G, n).
The β-discounted environment Cβ is defined by X1 = Y1, X2 = βY2, X3 = β2Y3, . . .,
(0 ≤ β ≤ 1) andY = (Y1, Y2, . . .) ∈ CI . Closely related are random variablesX1, . . . , Xn
with “increasing bounds”, i.e. ai ≤ Xi ≤ bi and nondecreasing sequences (ai) and (bi).
In both cases it suffices to study n = 2, i.e. X1 = αY1, X2 = Y2 and X1 = Y1, X2 = βY2,
respectively, where α, β ∈ [0, 1], and (Y1, Y2) ∈ C2I .
The following table collects a number of well-known “prophet” results, i.e. systematic
comparisons of v andm (see Hill and Kertz (1983), Hill (1983), Kertz (1986), Boshuizen
(1991), and Saint-Mont (1998)):
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Random Environment Upper boundary function
CG fG(x) = x− x ln(x)
CnG gn(x) = nx− (n− 1) xn/(n−1)
Ciid x
Cniid φn(x) strictly increasing, strictly concave, differentiable
CI , CnI fI(x) = 2x− x2
C2α 2x− x2 if x < α; and x+ (1− x)α if x ≥ α
Cβ, Cnβ fβ(x) = 2x− x2/β if x < 1−
√
1− β, and
fβ(x) = x+ (1− x)(2(1−
√
1− β)− β) if x ≥ 1−√1− β
In general, the difficult part consists in finding an upper boundary function, yet it is
easy to show that all pairs (x, y) with x ≤ y < fC(x) belong to some prophet region.
Moreover, prophet inequalities follow straightforwardly from prophet regions. As an
example, look at RI : Since fI(x)/x = 2 − x ≤ 2 and fI(x) − x = x(1 − x) ≤ 1/4, we
have M(X)/V (X) ≤ 2 and M(X) − V (X) ≤ 1/4 for all X ∈ CI . The same kind of
argument yields M(X) < V (X)(1− lnV (X)) and M(X)−V (X) < 1/e for all X ∈ CG.
3.2 Graphical comparisions
What can be learned from this upon comparing two gamblers with different information
levels? For every fixed horizon n, we have Rniid ⊆ RnI ⊆ RnG. It also turns out that
Rniid ⊂ Rmiid and RnG ⊂ RmG whenever n < m. Thus the longer the horizon or the
more general the environment, the better the outcome for the prophet (or the better
informed person in general). On the other hand, restrictions of any kind, in particular
the range of the random variables makes the corresponding prophet (or information)
region smaller. For example, R2α and Rβ must be subsets of RI .
The following illustration combines results achieved so far.
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Illustration 1. From above: The functions h4(x), f4(x), g4(x), fI(x), and x.
Note that h4 and f4 stem from comparisons of u and m, whereas g4 and fI are the
result of comparisons of v and m in the general and the independent environments.
Since for any environment Rv,mC ⊆ Ru,mC , we must have g4 ≤ h4 and fI ≤ f4. In
the case n = 2 the functions fI and f2 agree. This is no coincidence since X1 ≡ x
and x = P (X2 = 1) = 1 − P (X2 = 0) is the (standard) worst case scenario for the
statistician, and x = P (Xi = 1) = 1 − P (Xi = 0) (i = 1, 2) is the worst case scenario
for the minimally informed gambler considered above. In both scenarios their values
agree (e.g. they may both choose the second random variable) giving the prophet a
maximum advantage of x(1− x).
3.3 The overall information difference
The diagonal ‘y = x’ collects all situations where the information edge of a better
informed person does not result in a larger payoff. Thus, a degenerated prophet region
indicates that given a stochastic environment the information lead of the prophet never
pays off. Yet, the further some upper boundary function is away from the identical
function, the larger the better informed gambler’s overall advantage. A natural measure
of this advantage is the area between these functions, i.e. the integral∫ 1
0
(fC(x)− x) dx.
Given CI , the prophet’s advantage is qI =
∫ 1
0
x (1 − x) dx = 1/6. In the discounted
environment, after some algebra, we obtain
q(β) =
1
6
− (1− β) (1−
√
1− β)
3β
.
7
Note that q(1) = aI = 1/6, and l‘Hopital’s rule gives limβ↓0 q(β) = 0. Moreover, q(β)
is a convex function.
In the “increasing bounds” environment, after a little algebra, we obtain
q˜(α) =
∫ α
0
(2x− x2) dx+
∫ 1
α
(α− αx+ x) dx− 1
2
= α(α2/3− α + 1)/2.
Note that q˜(1) = qI = 1/6, and l‘Hopital’s rule gives limα↓0 q˜(α) = 0. Moreover, q˜(α)
is a concave function.
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.05
0.10
0.15
Illustration 2. α and β are shown on the x-axis. The functions on the unit interval
from the top down are the constant qI = 1/6, q˜(α) and q(β). The vertical and the
horizontal lines will be explained in Section 3.5.
However, given C(G, n), qI is augmented to
qG(n) =
∫ 1
0
(n− 1) (x− xn/(n−1)) dx = n− 1
2 (2n− 1) .
In particular, qG(2) = 1/6, qG(3) = 1/5, qG(4) = 3/14, qG(5) = 2/9, and qG(6) = 5/22.
Moreover, qG(n) is strictly increasing in n with limit 1/4, and
qG(∞) = −
∫ 1
0
x ln(x) dx = −
[
x2
(
ln(x)
2
− 1
4
)]1
0
=
1
4
.
3.4 Inverse problems
Given a stochastic environment C, and according to the above derivation, the standard
interpretation of a prophet inequality, is to look for a value to the statistician x0 =
V (X), such that the difference fC(x)− x is maximized. In the same vein one may look
for a value y0 on the y-axis, where the difference between the upper boundary and
the identical function is at its greatest point. In the independent case this amounts to
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inverting fI(x) = 2x−x2, which yields f−1I (y) = 1−
√
1− y. Maximizing y−(1−√1− y)
gives 1/4, which is obtained for y0 = 3/4.
Why do both perspectives agree with respect to the maximum difference? The rea-
son is that the statement M(X) − V (X) ≤ 1/4 holds for all X ∈ CI , and thus is a
property of the stochastic environment (and the two levels of information considered).
The pair (1/2, 3/4) ∈ RI is a point in two-dimensional space, attained by certain ex-
tremal sequences X∗. Thus, no matter how we choose to look at some region RC, the
corresponding prophet inequalities must hold.
However, the analytic considerations involving the inverse of the upper boundary func-
tion may be quite different. In the discounted case, f−1β (y) = β(1 −
√
1− y/β) if
y ≤ g(1−√1− β) = 3 − 2/β − 2√1− β + 2√1− β/β = y(β). Otherwise, it is easily
seen that f−1β is a linear, strictly decreasing function of y, and f
−1
β (1) = 1. The max-
imum of the function y − β(1 −√1− y/β) occurs at the point y = 3β/4 and is β/4.
Notice that
y
′
(β) =
β2 + β − 2 + 2√1− β
β2
√
1− β ≥ limβ↓0
β2 + β − 2 + 2√1− β
β2
√
1− β =
3
4
.
Thus, 3β/4 < y(β) for all β > 0. Due to continuity of f−1β , this yields β/4 as the overall
maximum of the difference, always occuring at y = 3β/4. Traditionally, one would have
said that the maximum difference of β/4 occurs at x = β/2.
Given CG, one has to invert fG(x) = x−x ln(x) in the unit interval. Using the theorem
of the derivative of the inverse function one may check that exp(1 + W−1(−y/e)) is
the inverse, where W−1(y) is the lower real branch of the Lambert W function (see
Corless, Gonnet, Hare & Jeffrey 1996: 331). Thus (y − exp(1 + W−1(−y/e)))′ = 1 +
1/(1+W−1(−y/e)) andW−1(−2/e2) = −2 immediately yield that the maximum occurs
at y = 2/e and equals 1/e. Traditionally, it’s the same difference occuring at x = 1/e.
3.5 Comparing stochastic environments
Switching stochastic environments amounts to a systematic comparison of the associ-
ated regions. In particular, if A is less general than B, we have RA ⊆ RB. Obviously,
it suffices to consider the upper boundary functions fA, fB of the two environments
involved. Traditionally, one would only determine supx(fB(x) − fA(x)). However, the
inverse problem supy(f
−1
A (y) − f−1B (y)), and the area
∫ 1
0
(fB(x) − fA(x)) dx are also
natural measures of discrepancy.
To illustrate the above, let us compare CI and CG:
First,
∫ 1
0
(fG(x)− fI(x)) dx = 3/4− 2/3 = 1/12.
Second, maximizing d(x) = fG(x)− fI(x) = x2 − x− x ln x leads to d ′(x) = 0⇔ 2x−
ln x = 2, which has the explicit solution x0 = −W0(−2/e2)/2 ≈ 0, 406376/2, where W0
is the principal (upper) real branch of the LambertW function (see Corless, Gonnet, Hare & Jeffrey
1996: 331). The point (x0, d(x0)) ≈ (0.2, 0.162) may be interpreted as follows: For every
value x to the statistician, fI(x) is the best a prophet can obtain in the independent
environment CI , and he can get arbitrary close to fG(x) if he is confronted with the
general environment CG. Given x, the difference fG(x) − fI(x) reflects the additional
gain (almost) obtainable to the prophet when moving from CI to CG, i.e. from the
restricted to the more general situation. The additional sequences of random variables
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provide him with an additional reward of d(x) = x(x − ln x − 1), which is maximized
if x = −W0(−2/e2)/2, yielding 0.162 as the additional payoff.
Third, starting with the prophet, the difference to be considered is δ(y) = f−1I (y) −
f−1G (y) = 1−
√
1− y−exp(1+W−1(−y/e)). Thus, conditional on y, the statistician may
(almost) lose this amount when the stochastic environment switches from independent
to arbitrary sequences of random variables. Determining the value y0 where δ(y) is at
its greatest, means looking for a constellation where the loss occuring to the statistician
is the most pronounced when moving from CI to CG. Now δ ′(y) = 0 is equivalent to
finding the unique root of the equation
−2
√
1− y = 1 +W−1(−y/e).
As a function of y, both the left hand side (L) and the right hand side (R) of the
equation are twice differentiable. On the unit interval L(y) is convex, strictly increasing,
L(0) = −2, and L(1) = 0. R(y) is concave, strictly increasing, limy↓0R(y) = −∞, and
R(0) = 0. Numerically, this yields the solution (y0, δ(y0)) ≈ (0.70, 0.119). Thus, in
the worst case, the statistician loses about 0.119, which is considerably less than the
prophet can hope to obtain when the environment extends from CI to CG.
The next illustration summarizes these results:
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Illustration 3. From above: The functions fG, fI , and x on the unit interval. The small
vertical line to the left illustrates the position of the maximum of the function d(x), the
small horizontal line illustrates the maximum of the function δ(y), see Section 3.5. The
other lines indicate the position of the maximum difference between the statistician
and the prophet in the independent environment, see the second paragraph of Section
3.4.
A different kind of analysis may be explicated using the regions C2α and C2β : Illustration
2 points out that restricting the range of the second random variable (β-discounting),
always produces a smaller region than restricting the range of the first random variable
by the same amount α. The largest difference between the size of the regions occurs if
α = β ≈ 0.45 and is approximately 0.077. On the other hand suppose that the areas
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of Rα and Rβ agree. This is tantamount to fixing a point on the y-axis. In this case
the largest difference between the parameter values occurs if the area covered by each
of the regions is about 1/8. There α ≈ 0.38 and β ≈ 0.83, thus the largest difference
between the parameter values is approximately 0.452.
Of course, analyses along the same lines can be carried out for other regions, e.g., RI
and Rniid, R
n
iid and R
n+1
iid , R
n
G and R
n+1
G , or R
n
G and RG.
3.6 Typical differences and ratios
Classical prophet inequalities are ‘worst case’ scenarios. They refer to the maximum
advantage of the prophet over the statistician. Additionally, it is straightforward to
ask for a ‘typical’ advantage, in particular a ‘typical’ difference or ratio. To do so, one
would have to define a probability measure on some environment C. Since the classes
of random variables considered are rather large, it is by no means clear how to do so in
a natural way. However, starting with a stochastic environment and two distinguished
levels of information, it is natural to consider uniform measure on the corresponding
prophet region RC.
Given the independent environment, the size of RI is 1/6. Thus, we obtain as the
typical difference between M(X) and V (X)
6
∫
RI
(y − x) d(x, y) = 6
∫ 1
0
(x4/2− x3 + x2/2) dx = 1/10,
instead of 1/4 in the worst case. Moreover, the typical ratio is
6
∫
RI
y/x d(x, y) = 6
∫ 1
0
(x3/2− 2x2 + 3x/2) dx = 5/4 < 2.
Given CG, RG covers an area of 1/4, giving the following typical difference and ratio:
4
∫
RG
(y − x) d(x, y) = 4
∫ 1
0
(x2 ln2(x)/2) dx = 4/27 < 1/e
and
4
∫
RG
y/x d(x, y) = 4
∫ 1
0
(x ln2(x)/2− x ln(x)) dx = 3/2.
The last equation is particularly interesting because there is no upper bound in the
corresponding worst case scenario. Notice in the other examples that the typical results
are considerably smaller than the constants in the corresponding worst cases.
Moreover, one may ask about the probability that a typical difference or ratio exceeds
a certain bound. The ratio y/x = c⇔ y = cx is a straight line through the origin, so,
given CI , the question amounts to calculating
P (M(X)/V(X)) ≥ c) =
∫ t
0
(2x− x2 − cx) dx/
∫ 1
0
(2x− x2 − x) dx = (2− c)3,
where t = 2 − c ≥ 0 is determined by the equation cx = y = 2x− x2, and 1 ≤ c ≤ 2.
Given CG, we obtain
P (M(X)/V(X)) ≥ c) =
∫ t
0
(x− x ln x− cx) dx/
∫ 1
0
(x− x ln(x)− x) dx = e2(1−c),
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where t is determined by the equation cx = x− x lnx⇔ t = exp(1− c), and c ≥ 1.
In the case of the difference we are interested in the probability that it exceeds a certain
bound d ≥ 0. Again, consider CI first. Since y−x = d⇔ y = x+d, we have to calculate
P (M(X)− V (X) ≥ d) =
∫ t
s
(2x− x2 − (x+ d)) dx∫ 1
0
(2x− x2 − x) dx
=
√
1− 4d · (1− 4d).
Here, 0 ≤ d ≤ 1/4, and s and t are determined by the roots of the equation x + d =
2x− x2 in the unit interval, that is s = 1/2−√1− 4d/2 and t = 1/2 +√1− 4d/2.
Finally, given CG, we obtain with 0 ≤ d ≤ 1/e
P (D ≥ d) = P (M(X)− V (X) ≥ d) = −
∫ t
s
(x ln x+ d) dx / aG(∞),
where s and t are determined by the roots of the equation d = −x ln x in the unit
interval. Some algebra is needed to get s = exp(W−1(−d)) and t = exp(W0(−d)). The
subsequent integration results in
P (D ≥ d) = d2

1 + 4W0(−d)− 2 ln
(
−d
W0(−d)
)
W 20 (−d)
−
1 + 4W−1(−d)− 2 ln
(
−d
W−1(−d)
)
W 2−1(−d)

 .
4 A systematic study
In the following we are going to apply the ‘program’ outlined in the last section to u
and m, using the independent and the general stochastic environments:
The overall information difference. Let us first compute the areas of Ru,mC(I,n),∫ 1
0
(fn(x)− x) dx = 1
2
− 1
n+ 1
=
n− 1
2(n+ 1)
→ 1/2,
and Ru,m
C(G,n);∫ 1
0
(hn(x)− x) dx = 1
2n
− 1
2n2
+
1
2
− 1
n
+
1
2n2
=
1
2
− 1
2n
=
n− 1
2n
→ 1/2.
Thus, their overall information distance is the size of the set Ru,mC(G,n)\Ru,mC(I,n),∫ 1
0
(hn(x)− fn(x)) dx = 1
n+ 1
− 1
2n
=
n− 1
2n(n+ 1)
→ 0 if n→∞.
Inverse Problems. In the independent case, f−1n (y) = 1 − n
√
1− y is the inverse
function. The maximum of y − (1 − n√1− y) is attained for y0 = 1 − n−n/(n−1) and
equals n−1/(n−1) − n−n/(n−1). In the general case, the inverse function is h−1n (y) = y/n.
Thus, the maximum of y − y/n is attained at y0 = 1, giving a maximum difference of
1− 1/n.
Comparing the independent and the general environments. Here, one has to
maximize d(x) = (1−x)n+nx− 1. Since d′(x) = n(1− (1−x)n−1) > 0 if x ≤ 1/n, the
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maximum occurs at x0 = 1/n and yields a difference of (1−1/n)n, converging to 1/e if
n→∞. The inverse functions lead to a difference of δ(y) = 1− (1− y)1/n− y/n. Thus,
δ
′
(y) = −(1 − (1 − y)(n−1)/−n)/n > 0 if y > 0, and the maximum occurs at y0 = 1,
yielding a difference of 1− 1/n.
Typical differences and ratios. For CnI we calculate∫
Ru,m
C(I,n)
(y − x) d(x, y) = 1
6
− 1
n + 2
+
1
2(2n+ 1)
=
(n− 1)2
3(n+ 2)(2n+ 1)
and ∫
Ru,m
C(I,n)
y/x d(x, y) = −1
4
+
n∑
i=1
(1/i)− 1
2
2n∑
i=1
(1/i).
Thus, the typical difference dI and ratio rI in the independent situation are
dI =
2(n− 1)(n+ 1)
3(n+ 2)(2n+ 1)
→ 1/3, rI = (n+ 1)(2
∑n
i=1(1/i)−
∑2n
i=1(1/i)− 1/2)
(n− 1) →∞.
For CnG, analogous integrations yield∫
Ru,m
C(G,n)
(y − x) d(x, y) =
∫ 1/n
0
∫ nx
x
(y − x) dy dx+
∫ 1
1/n
∫ 1
x
(y − x) dy dx = (n− 1)
2
6n2
and ∫
Ru,m
C(G,n)
y/x d(x, y) =
∫ 1/n
0
∫ nx
x
y/x dy dx+
∫ 1
1/n
∫ 1
x
y/x dy dx =
lnn
2
.
Thus, the typical difference dG and ratio rG in the general environment are
dG =
n− 1
3n
→ 1/3 , rG = n lnn
n− 1 →∞.
Probabilities that a typical difference or ratio exceeds a certain bound. For
1 ≤ c ≤ n this amounts to calculating
P (rI ≥ c) = 2(n+ 1)
n− 1
∫ t
0
(1− (1− x)n − cx) dx
=
2
n− 1
(
(1− t)n+1 + (n+ 1)t
(
1− ct
2
)
− 1
)
,
where t is the unique root of the equation cx = 1− (1− x)n in the unit interval, and
P (rG ≥ c) = 2n
n− 1
(∫ 1/n
0
(nx− cx)dx+
∫ 1/c
1/n
(1− cx)dx
)
=
n− c
c(n− 1) .
Notice that limn→∞(n− c)/(c(n− 1)) = 1/c.
In the case of the difference, given CnI , and thus 0 ≤ d ≤ n−1/(n−1) − n−n/(n−1), we
calculate
P (dI ≥ d) = 2(n+ 1)
n− 1
∫ t
s
(1− (1− x)n − (x+ d)) dx,
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where the values of s and t (s < t) are determined by the roots of the equation
x + d = 1 − (1 − x)n in the unit interval. Again, in general, s and t cannot be given
explicitly. Finally, given CnG, we obtain with 0 ≤ d ≤ 1− 1/n
P (dG ≥ d) = 2n
n− 1
(∫ 1/n
a/(n−1)
(nx− x− d) dx+
∫ 1
1/n
(1− x− d) dx
)
= 1−
(
dn
n− 1
)(
2− d− d
n− 1
)
→ (1− d)2 if n→∞.
In both cases the prophet regions Ru,mC(I,n) and R
u,m
C(G,n) converge towards the upper trian-
gle T = {(x, y)|0 ≤ x ≤ y ≤ 1} in the unit square. Thus, in the limit, the typical ratios
and differences agree and can be computed directly via T , yielding the probabilities
1/c and (1− d)2.
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